Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-Cooperation by Solvang, Ole
Human Rights Brief
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 4
2008
Russia and the European Court of Human Rights:
The Price of Non-Cooperation
Ole Solvang
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Solvang, Ole. "Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-Cooperation." Human Rights Brief 15, no.2
(2008): 14-17.
14
The second Chechen War was characterized by widespread human 
rights abuses against the civilian population.
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Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-Cooperation
by Ole Solvang*
In the majority of cases from chechnya pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Russian government has refused to provide the ECtHR with impor-
tant documents. Recent cases indicate that Russia might be pun-
ished for its non-cooperation, but that there are limits to how far 
the ECtHR is willing to go toward enforcement. 
chechNya aNd The euRoPeaN couRT of humaN RighTs
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has 
struggled with a violent separatist movement in its southern 
republic of Chechnya. An initial military attempt to bring 
Chechnya back into Russia’s fold met with embarrassing fail-
ure. As a result, Russia’s then President Boris Yeltsin signed 
a peace agreement with his Chechen counterpart in 1996, giv-
ing Chechnya de facto independence. After a series of apart-
ment bombings, officially attributed to Chechen terrorists and 
a Chechen armed incursion into the neighboring republic of 
Dagestan, Russia’s central government launched a second mili-
tary campaign in 1999. 
The so-called second Chechen war was characterized by 
widespread grave human rights abuses. Indiscriminate use of 
deadly force, torture, and extra-judicial killings became regular 
occurrences for Chechnya’s civilian population. Federal military 
forces regularly carried out cleansing operations (zachistki), 
during which they surrounded and isolated populated areas 
for several days to check the inhabitants’ identity documents. 
During these operations civilians regularly disappeared, never to 
be seen again. As the military conflict has subsided, large-scale 
cleansing operations have been replaced by identity checks by 
armed, masked men at night. These checks often lead to dis-
appearances. Human rights organizations estimate that 5,000 
people may have disappeared in Chechnya since 1999 at the 
hands of military and security forces. Human Rights Watch calls 
the widespread practice of disappearances in Chechnya a crime 
against humanity.1
Perpetrators of these violations have enjoyed virtual impu-
nity. Since 1999 there have been only a handful of convictions 
for grave human rights violations in Chechnya. Only one indi-
vidual has been convicted for a disappearance-related crime.2 
While human rights violations were also widespread during 
the first Chechen war, Russia’s 1998 ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) provided vic-
tims of the second war with a powerful new tool for seeking 
redress for human rights violations — the ECtHR. As a result of 
Russia’s ratification, the ECtHR obtained jurisdiction to review 
violations of the Convention in Russia, including Chechnya, that 
have taken place since May 1998. 
Consequently, several hundred victims from Chechnya have 
submitted applications to the ECtHR.3 Since the ECtHR handed 
down its first judgment in a Chechen case,4 Russia has lost, on 
some or all counts, in 24 cases concerning grave human rights 
abuses in Chechnya.5 Russia was obliged to effectively inves-
tigate the violations and hold the perpetrators accountable, pay 
monetary compensation to the victims, and undertake measures 
to prevent similar violations from recurring. However, access 
to documents held by Russia for criminal investigations has 
become a contentious issue. 
fuRNishiNg all NecessaRy faciliTies?
Although it can conduct oral hearings and fact-finding mis-
sions, the ECtHR decides the majority of its cases solely on 
the basis of written submissions. Through several exchanges 
throughout the multi-year procedure of bringing a case to the 
ECtHR, both the applicants and the respondent state file submis-
sions, respond to each other’s arguments and submit supporting 
evidence. 
States’ obligation to cooperate with the ECtHR is described 
in Article 38 of the Convention, which states that the ECtHR 
shall “pursue the examination of the case, together with the 
representatives of the parties, and if need be, undertake an inves-
tigation, for the effective conduct of which the States concerned 
shall furnish all necessary facilities.”6 This usually means that 
the state in question is under an obligation to provide the ECtHR 
with documents that contain information relevant to the case. 
The ECtHR has previously been critical of Turkey regarding 
its Article 38 compliance. In several cases concerning violations 
in the context of security force operations, the Turkish authori-
ties failed to disclose documents relating either to the operations 
themselves or to the subsequent investigation. More recently, 
however, Article 38 concerns have surfaced in cases against 
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Russia, and particularly in cases concerning human rights viola-
tions in Chechnya. 
In most cases from Chechnya pending before the ECtHR, 
evidence suggests that representatives of the authorities were 
involved in disappearances, torture, or extra-judicial executions. 
In some cases, Russian authorities initially admitted to detaining 
an individual, but later denied it after the person disappeared, 
or claimed that they had been released.7 Furthermore, accused 
perpetrators often travel in heavily armed military vehicles that 
only the authorities possess, and freely travel through heavily 
guarded checkpoints after curfew. 
Russian authorities employ several lines of defense, often 
claiming there is insufficient evidence to prove government 
involvement. They also allege that rebel fighters disguised as 
federal forces perpetrate these crimes. In most cases, they argue 
that a criminal investigation is still ongoing and it would there-
fore be premature for the ECtHR to pass a judgment in the case.
In all Chechen cases, the ECtHR requests that the Russian 
authorities submit a copy of the criminal case file. Access to 
these documents assists the ECtHR in establishing the facts in 
the case and allows the ECtHR to properly assess whether the 
investigation has been effective. Such access is particularly 
important in certain types of cases. In cases regarding allega-
tions of unacknowledged detention and/or enforced disappear-
ances, often only the respondent state has access to information 
capable of corroborating or refuting applicants’ allegations that 
their rights have been violated. 
The Russian government consistently refuses to provide the 
ECtHR with the requested documents. Referring to Article 161 
of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, Russian authori-
ties often argue that disclosure of documents from the case file 
would compromise the federal investigation and could violate 
the rights and legitimate interests of the participants in the crimi-
nal proceedings.8 They also argue that the requested documents 
contain state and military secrets, and that the authorities do not 
trust the applicants and their representatives to keep the infor-
mation confidential.9 The authorities usually invite the ECtHR 
to review documents not containing military or state secrets in 
Russia, without rights to make copies.10
Several times the ECtHR has rejected Russian authorities’ 
arguments against the disclosure of documents. The ECtHR has 
noted that Russian authorities can invoke the ECtHR’s Rule 33, 
which would prevent the documents from being public, if they 
believe that disclosure of information would be to the detri-
ment of the investigation. In addition, the ECtHR has noted that 
Russian authorities have been inconsistent in their use of Article 
161. In several cases, authorities have submitted documents 
from the criminal case file.11 
Faced with the government’s refusal to provide the neces-
sary documents, the ECtHR has several options to apply pres-
sure. The ECtHR has, in several cases, drawn inferences as to 
the validity of applicants’ allegations. In the case Imakayeva v. 
Russia, the ECtHR drew inferences from the Russian authori-
ties’ refusal to provide the necessary documents to hold that the 
authorities were responsible for the illegal detention and disap-
pearance of Marzet Imakayeva’s son.12 
Another option is to hold that the Russian authorities have 
not “furnished all necessary facilities,” and have thereby vio-
lated Article 38 of the Convention. Finding a violation of Article 
38 can sometimes generate additional negative publicity for the 
respondent state, and at least one ECtHR judge believes that 
repeated Article 38 violations should lead to higher monetary 
awards for the applicants. 
The ECtHR generally employs one of these options, but 
the Russian authorities have not suffered significant negative 
consequences from their refusal to provide case files. Recent 
ECtHR judgments in two Chechen cases, however, show that 
the ECtHR is willing to increase pressure on the Russian gov-
ernment, but only to a certain point. 
PuTTiNg oN The PRessuRe 
On January 1, 2000, after a period of heavy shelling, Russian 
special police forces (OMON) moved into the area where 
Zaynap Abdul-Vagapovna Tangiyeva and her relatives lived in 
the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, Chechnya. Relations 
between civilians and police forces soon became tense as police 
forces regularly carried out identity checks, ordered civilians 
to collect dead bodies, and selected men for “exchange” with 
the fighters. On one specific occasion, a drunk OMON officer 
threatened to open fire on all civilians. 
On January 11, 2000, during a daily check on her relatives, 
Tangiyeva discovered that her father’s house was burning. She 
“At least one judge 
believes that repeated 
Article 38 violations — 
refusing to provide the 
Court with documents 
containing relevant infor-
mation — should lead to 
higher monetary awards  
for the applicants.”
found her father’s and a neighbor’s dead bodies in the kitchen, 
both with gunshot wounds to the head. The charred remains 
of her mother and uncle were later found in the basement. 
Frustrated by the authorities’ unwillingness to investigate the 
killings, Tangiyeva lodged an application with the ECtHR in 
April 2000, arguing that federal servicemen had killed her rela-
tives. 
Tangiyeva’s application referred to several additional viola-
tions in the same region and time period. In previous cases, the 
ECtHR held that Russian federal forces controlled the area and 
had committed grave human rights violations.13 The Tangiyeva 
case, however, contained less concrete evidence that Russian 
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The Russian government has blocked European Court requests for 
documents sought in connection with Chechens’ claims.
federal forces were responsible for the violations, and there were 
no direct eyewitnesses to the killings. 
To establish the facts of the case, the ECtHR judges consid-
ered the documents from the criminal case crucial, and twice 
requested that the Russian authorities submit them. Although 
Russian authorities submitted a number of procedural docu-
ments, they refused to submit any of the collected witness state-
ments or other important procedural documents, such as descrip-
tions of the sites or results of the ballistic expert reports, arguing 
that disclosure would be detrimental to the ongoing federal 
investigation.14
In response, the ECtHR found that the Russian authorities 
had violated Article 38 of the Convention. In addition, it drew 
affirmative inferences as to the validity of Tangiyeva’s allega-
tions from the authorities’ refusal. The ECtHR determined that 
the applicant had made a prima facie case that federal military 
forces killed her relatives. The ECtHR further noted that when 
the government prevents the ECtHR from reaching factual 
conclusions by failing to submit requested documents, the 
burden falls on the government to argue conclusively why the 
documents in question would not corroborate the applicants’ 
allegations. In the alternative it may provide a satisfactory and 
convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred. 
The burden of proof is thus shifted to the government, and if it 
fails, issues will arise concerning the substance of the complaint. 
As the Russian government, in the ECtHR’s opinion, failed to 
provide such an explanation, the ECtHR held that the appli-
cant’s relatives’ deaths could be attributed to the State.15
On November 29, 2007, the ECtHR held that the Russian 
authorities were responsible for the killing of the applicant’s 
relatives; that they had not conducted an effective investigation; 
that the indifference that they showed towards Tangiyeva con-
stitutes inhuman treatment; that Tangiyeva had had no effective 
remedies for these violations; and that the Russian authorities 
had failed to “furnish all necessary facilities.” The ECtHR 
awarded EUR 60.000 to Tangiyeva.16 
Though the compensation did not differ substantially from 
previous Chechen cases, criticism of the authorities’ non-coop-
eration seemed stronger and the ECtHR seemed more willing to 
draw inferences in the Tangiyeva case. This increased willing-
ness to draw inferences prompted, for the first time in a Chechen 
case, a dissenting opinion from two judges. The Russian and 
Azerbaijani judges argued that the majority had gone too far, 
and that there was not enough evidence to hold Russian authori-
ties responsible for the killings. Beyond the Tangiyeva case, 
the most recent judgment in a Chechen case demonstrates that 
there are limits to how far the majority is willing to go in this 
direction. 
TakiNg The PRessuRe off?
On September 17, 2000, loud screams woke the Zubayrayev 
family. According to the testimony of Malika Zubayrayeva, 
a large group of men in camouflage uniforms and, in some 
instances, masks, wearing the Russian army’s insignia and 
speaking Russian without an accent, entered the house and 
forced everyone outside. When the soldiers left, they took 
Mailka’s husband with them. Shortly thereafter he was found 
dead with a gunshot wound to the back of the head. Investigators 
arrived at the scene several hours later, but according to the 
family, they were rude and did not interview anyone about the 
incident. The family did not subsequently report the incident, 
reasoning it would probably receive the same treatment. Several 
months later the family left Russia out of concern for their secu-
rity and lodged an application with the ECtHR.
In the course of the ECtHR proceedings, the Russian govern-
ment claimed that illegal armed groups committed the killing, 
referring to several other killings that night, including that of 
a local police officer. One person was charged with the crime, 
but was later released because he had confessed under duress. 
The authorities refused to provide the ECtHR with the entire 
criminal case file. They eventually submitted approximately 50 
of 300 documents. 
In its judgment of January 10, 2008, the ECtHR again held 
that it could both draw inferences from the authorities’ refusal to 
provide the entire case file and that the authorities had violated 
Article 38 by not providing the necessary documents.17 
Unlike in Tangiyeva, however, the ECtHR did not find that it 
could hold the authorities responsible for the killing. Attempting 
to distinguish the Zubayrayev case from other Chechen cases, 
the judges referred to two elements. First, the judges consid-
ered that there was less evidence in Zubayrayev to implicate 
government forces. Second, the judges emphasized that the 
applicants had never communicated their version of the events 
to the authorities. The ECtHR also noted that from the outset the 
Russian criminal investigation had operated under the idea that 
illegal insurgents committed the crime. 
Again the judgment prompted dissenting opinions, this time 
from the judges from Cyprus and Luxemburg. Judges Loucaides 
and Spielmann argued that the applicants had made a prima 
facie case, and they took issue with the majority’s reference to 
an investigation that the ECtHR had already found to be inef-
fective. 
The PRice of NoN-cooPeRaTioN
access to docUments from domestic criminal investigations 
has been a contentious issue in all cases from Chechnya, and 
unless Russian authorities change their position, this issue will 
continue to cause friction between the ECtHR and the Russian 
authorities in future cases. 
Both the Tangiyeva judgment and the Zubayrayev judgment 
are not yet final. It is likely that the Russian authorities will try 
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to appeal the Tangiyeva judgment, and it is possible that the 
applicant might appeal the Zubayrayev judgment. If these judg-
ments are not overturned, they provide an indication of how the 
ECtHR will deal with this issue in the future. The Tangiyeva 
judgment demonstrates that the Russian authorities will pay 
a price for non-cooperation with the ECtHR: if applicants 
present a prima facie case, and the authorities refuse to provide 
requested documents without a proper explanation, the Russian 
authorities will likely lose the case.
The Zubayrayev judgment, however, shows that there is a 
limit as to how far the ECtHR is willing to go in this direction. 
The judges seem to agree that the burden of proof shifts if the 
applicants make a prima facie case and the government has 
information that might corroborate or refute the allegations. If 
the Zubayrayev judgment becomes final, key issues in future 
cases will be determining what constitutes a prima facie case, 
and what is needed for the burden of proof to shift to the respon-
dent state. 
Russian authorities may have benefited from their refusal to 
provide the ECtHR with documents from the investigation in the 
Zubayrayev case. If the ECtHR had had access to all case docu-
ments it may have found differently. In that case, the Zubayrayev 
judgment undermined the strong stance in Tangiyeva, and 
Russian authorities will be encouraged to continue to withhold 
documents that might implicate the government. Such a situa-
tion is obviously problematic for the ECtHR, and the dissenting 
opinions in both cases demonstrate that the judges themselves 
have not reached a consensus on how to solve this problem. 
If judges are unwilling to punish the government for its 
non-cooperation by finding substantive violations, an alterna-
tive punishment could be to increase the compensation that the 
government must pay. Increasing the pressure on the Russian 
authorities to provide the ECtHR with important documents, 
however, is crucial for the effective protection of the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Allowing the Russian authorities to withhold vital documents 
from the ECtHR without any serious consequences would sig-
nificantly undermine the ECtHR’s legitimacy, and ultimately 
erode the protection of the rights of those who the ECtHR is 
supposed to protect, such as the Chechens. HRB
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